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Abstract
ve
some significant capacity to forecast our own reactions to such situations. However, the evidence shows that we often do not 
know how we would react in situations only slightly different from those we are in. Thus, offline simulation accounts appear to
be wrong. Instead, the errors that we make suggest that we typically forecast our reactions by thinking of what it would make
sense for us to think, feel, or do.
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1. Perspective Taking
An influential view of how we gain insight into how others think, feel, want, or what they will do is that we
imagine being like the other person in respects we think are relevant, then examine ourselves for clues as to what we
would be thinking, feeling, wanting, or be inclined to do, and then ascribe this to her. This process may involve
taking on different beliefs, desires, predilections, etc., while w .
Unfortunately, the assumption that the perspective taking gives us good insight into the thoughts, feelings, desires,
or intentions of others is flawed. Too often we cannot figure out what we would think, feel, etc. under situations
only slightly different from those we find ourselves in. In this paper, I present evidence that shows our failure to
understand ourselves, and how it affects our understanding of simulation, decision-making, and what we do when
we predict what we would feel, think, do, etc.
1.1. Failure to Forecast
We have problems forecasting our actual reactions to many situations. We fail to anticipate the effects that
owning an object has on our evaluation of its value [5][6], the ways literary passages affect our emotions or noise
affects our appreciation of a movie, our willingness to endure electric shock [7]; we misjudge our willingness to
shock other people when asked by an experimenter to do so [8][9], our likelihood of helping a person in need when
others are present [10][11], our tendency to steal for non-monetary gain [12][13] or to cheat on tests [14], how much
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we will enjoy holidays, how devastated we will be by being told we have a fatal disease [16], the lengths we are 
willing to go to not to be impolite or be embarrassed [17][18], how we will react to sexual harassment [19], how 
long we will experience positive or negative affect, such as guilt or regret [20], how we will react to sexual 
harassment or interrogation [17], and how much we will change in the future [21].  
In many cases, our imagination fails to model correctly the situation we are trying to transpose ourselves into 
because we overestimate the similarity between how we feel now and how we would feel under different 
circumstances. Hunger affects how we think and what we are likely to do in ways that we do not foresee when we 
are not hungry [22][23], and thirst is associated with similar forecasting errors [24]. Pain is typically remembered as 
being worse than it was [25]. Women tend to remember labor as being worse than they reported it being during 
labor [26], and people who donate blood remember the experience as having been more unpleasant than they 
reported it being at the time [27]. People are not good at remembering the quality of their pain [28][26]. At the same 
time, they underestimate the effects pain had or will have on their behavior. It is a testament to human optimism that 
women tend to magnify the pain of labor and their ability to endure it without a little help from modern medicine 
[29]. Alcoholics [30] and drug addicts [31] also radically underestimate the effects of having a drink or taking a bit 
of the drug while overestimating their ability to resist future abuse. These failures to forecast demonstrates that our 
confidence in our ability to know how we would think, feel, or act under different circumstances is misplaced, 
though it goes mostly unchallenged. If our ability to understand others by taking their perspective is premised on our 
ability to forecast our reactions to hypothetical situations, this is a significant problem. 
2. Imagining and Deciding 
A reason that we poor at projecting ourselves into counterfactual situations and getting good psychological 
results by means of it is that we typically imagine in a relatively crude manner. We typically imagine the bare 
outlines of hypothetical scenarios. Thus, our simulations are likely to leave out contextual factors that are relevant to 
 reaction. But the problem seems to be worse than not taking the time to represent the situation in enough 
detail. Imagine a group of old people walking along and suddenly one of them falls. Will you rush to help? If you 
are like most people, you think you will. Now imagine there being many people around you. Will adding this detail 
to your imagined scenario make a difference? Unlikely. Most people still think they will help. But, as we have seen, 
the presence of inactive bystanders prevents most of us from doing so. So it does not matter how vividly I imagine 
others being there, I still imagine helping the person in trouble. It seems that I cannot, by means of the imagination, 
trick my psychological system into producing the responses it would produce under actual circumstances, only 
imaginatively. What is needed is being in the very same situation, or one very much like it.  
The above is true of sexual harassment, hunger, pain, and ownership; all relatively common experiences. A 
person typically cannot recreate her visceral experiences either by imagining being in situations that typically 
produce such experiences or by remembering situations in which she had such experiences [32]. eople can 
[33, p.285]. According to Linda Levine and colleagues, explicit memory for episodic events quickly degrades, 
becomes infused with semantic knowledge about the significance of such events and affect, and is influenced by the 
[34][35]. Implicit memory of many such emotional events can remain 
relatively intact and be triggered by similar situations, but they cannot be recalled at will or by means of the 
imagination.  
projecting 
themselves into the past, where they know the outcomes but are trying to understand them, or they are imagining the 
[36] is mirrored by a tendency 
to remember emotions more in line with current knowledge or appraisals than as those actually experienced [34]. 
Our memories of our past actions and experiences are relatively poor and heavily reconstructed [35][37]. But 
reconstruction differs from construction. Imagining oneself in the past is less characterized by prototypical 
representations of situations and scenarios, is more filled in with details and contextual factors, and tends to be 
characterized by enhancement. For instance, if asked to remember missing the train [25], people tend to recall their 
worst experience of it. Conversely, people often recall only good things about certain events, such as holidays [15]. 
When people recall visceral experiences, they do not re-experience them however weakly. In fact, almost half of the 
subjects in one study reported that they could not even recall the visceral sensations of being in pain [32]. People are 
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good at recalling pain intensity, but this intensity is disconnected from any actual reenactment and often from 
phenomenological recall of what it was like as well [28]. W -
representations of reality [38, p.1354]. 
When we imagine the future, we tend to do so in rather naked, decontextualized, and prototypical ways [39] 
[38][35][40]. Instead of reaching into the past to retrieve actual memories of similar events, we engage our semantic 
memory, i.e. ideas about what certain situations, events, structures, and so on, are like. These ideas are obviously not 
entirely disconnected from our personal memories. However, when people transpose themselves into the future, 
they seem to rely primarily on general knowledge of such events and structures, and only secondarily on recall of 
actual experiences. Imagining the future is less a matter of reenactment than of engaging semantic, declarative, or 
systematic knowledge.  
Our prospecting is not merely characterized by the nakedness of the representations we avail ourselves of, but 
also by rational and moral ideality. People are optimistic about their ability to withstand pain, to resist temptation, to 
do the right thing, to resist social pressure, and so on. Their optimistic projections, however, turn out to be wrong 
more often than not. We could ascribe this optimism to our penchant for self-enhancement. But a better 
interpretation, I think, is that the capacity for prospection is part and parcel of our capacity to make decisions. When 
we prospect we are not, in actual fact, trying to predict what we would do, but we are in the process of deciding 
what to do. Our decisions are typically made on the basis of the desanguinated representations of semantic memory. 
People tend to err on the side of what they assume is reasonable when they think about their reactions. Their ideas of 
their reactions cannot be based on past experience, in many cases, as this would have led to rather different ideas 
about what they would do, think, etc.  
If I am right that we typically imagine what we ought to do, feel, think, and so on in a suitably broad sense of 
ought then a certain account of simulation, i.e. offline simulation, must be wrong. According to this view, we 
engage our psychological system when we imagine having certain beliefs, desires, etc. and it produces imagined 
reactions that mirror the actual reactions we would have [1]. Another view of simulation, deriving from the work of 
Martin Davies, Tom Stone, and Jane Heal, maintains the ability to simulate relies on our capacity to make decisions 
and is therefore an essentially normative enterprise [41][4]. The evidence presented here suggests that accounts of 
simulation that stress the normativity of counterfactual reasoning are on the right track.  
3. Human Decision Making 
According to Antonio Damasio, emotions help limit the space of options a subject considers when deliberating. 
In the course of experience representations of events come to be associated with an emotion; they become 
somatically marked [42]. When people represent scenarios and outcomes, these somatic markers limit what they 
consider in the first place, but also what they decide to do by making her feel good about some options and bad 
about others. If this system is impaired a person will have problems inhibiting actions, carrying out everyday or 
routing tasks, and deciding what to do. According to this view, representations tokened at will do indeed have the 
power to evoke in the subject reactions similar to those she would have in the actual situation. This is clearly a 
problem for the suggestion here. 
It is a card choosing task where some 
decks are high-risk s, having a few high-paying cards but many losing cards, and others yield smaller monetary 
rewards, but have more lower-paying cards and fewer losing cards. People typically avoid the high-risk decks after a 
couple of rounds. At this point, attempts to reach for the high-risk decks are associated with increased skin 
conductance, which researchers interpret as an aversive response. It is assumed that the aversive emotional response 
to choosing from high-risk decks drives the decision to choose cards primarily from low-risk ones. But the Iowa 
gambling task is not a good model for decision-making generally. Since the negative physiological reaction 
occurred as a result of an action that was initiated, then aborted, it is best regarded as an example what we may call 
- -penalty decks is also the result of a decision made 
in the situation itself. The subject is not imagining being in the situation; she is in the situation. Her representation of 
the situation is not composed of memories or of cognitive representations. Instead, it is a construction out of sensory 
perception. It contains details rarely represented in more cognitive non-perceptual ways of thinking about that 
situation. Once she has learnt the association between decks and losses, she makes decisions in essentially the same 
situation in which she learnt those associations.  
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By contrast to this type of decision-making, we have what we might cal -  
you are not in the relevant situation, but are trying to imagine what would be the best option, the most reasonable 
conclusions, etc., in an imagined or anticipated situation. This type of decision-making requires you to represent a 
situation that diverges from the one that you are in, and you presumably do so using semantic, perhaps some 
episodic, memory, general knowledge, and so on. Such representations are almost certainly less rich than the 
perceptual representations that we produce when we are in the situation itself. In other words, longer-term decision-
making creates imagined reactions to representations of a different richness than immediate decision-making. 
Consequently, we cannot simply assume that what seems to be true in some immediate decision-making situations 
characterizes longer-term decision-making. In fact, the two are quite distinct. Damasio can be right about the role 
that somatically marked representations play in immediate decision-making, and I can be right about longer-term 
decision-making and its role in the empathic imagination. For we have considered cases of what I have called 
longer-term decision-making. We are rarely in the situation or, if you like, almost in the situation, that we are trying 
to forecast our reaction to. And this is certainly true of most simulations. This is part of the reason, I contend, that 
we are so surprisingly poor at getting our reactions right. The other part is that what we deploy, when we project 
ourselves into counterfactual scenarios, is mostly a normative theory about what it would be reasonable to feel, 
think, or do (except when we are trying to understand our past reactions).  
The empathic imagination or simulation is limited by our ability to recreate the relevant situation in our 
imagination in sufficient detail. We have a relatively limited capacity to recreate decision-making in the situation. 
We generally do not have the imaginative acuity to recreate situations in all the respects that matter to our 
psychological reactions. For instance, recreating in the right detail a situation in which we are hungry, in pain, or 
own a small, insignificant object is apparently either not possible, or too hard for most people, for it to have the 
downstream effects that we require to correctly forecast our subsequent reactions. (Of course, at the coarse level we 
do just fine: when we imagine being hungry, we imagine wanting to eat, and so on. But this may largely be the 
result of semantic, not episodic, memory.) Though it may seem to the subject that she is recreating to the situation in 
her mind just fine, she in fact fails to recreate the internal psychological environment sufficient to trigger the 
responses in her imagination that she would have in the actual situation.  
When thinking about the role affect plays in decision-making, we need to consider that episodic memories of 
affect fade over time often in a matter of hours and that recall becomes increasingly characterized by semantic 
memory of what the relevant emotion is like, under what circumstances it is experienced, and so on [43][35]. 
Implicit memories, on the other hand, may retain their freshness and vividness, but they cannot be called to mind at 
will. They are triggered by circumstances that are very like the ones they were originally experienced in. Levine et 
g 
physiological arousal, narrowing of attention to goal relevant information, and consideration of a restricted range of 
[35, p.1069]. In this way, implicit memories affect a subject in ways that explicit, and particularly semantic, 
memory does not.  
4. Conclusion 
Our capacity to make decisions in the situation uses resources that are not accessible to the imagination. When 
we are in a situation, we have information available to us through sensory perception of an extraordinary richness 
that is simply not mimicked either in what we will come to recall of the situation or in our semantic representation 
of that type of situation. Being in the situation unlocks the richness of implicit memory, with all the associated 
visceral and emotional reactions, which are closed to the pale, stylized representations of explicit memory (semantic 
or episodic). When we recreate situations by means of the imagination, what we have available are these 
impoverished representations, which yield information only about essential or central characteristics of objects or 
events. Yet they may allow us to systematize and generalize about the world in a way that rich implicit memory 
representations cannot. Do we sometimes imagine in a way that is tied to the situation and thus can avail ourselves 
of our implicit memories? Perhaps, but there is little doubt that the main form of empathic imagination, or 
simulation, is of situations that are sufficiently different from the one that we are in that we cannot avail ourselves of 
such memories. 
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